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I

IN T:L·;

SUPREl~

COURT OF THE

3TAT~

THE STilT~,~ OF UTA;{,

OF UTAH

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent )
)

vs.

)

)
)

JA: .:·~3 Bo DEL,TNIS,
Defon,ta:rt and App0llant

Case Ho.

9920

)
)

This is a criminal case 5. n which the
Defendant was charged with the crime of for-

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Tha casa was tried to a Juryo

From a

verdict of Qtilty the Defendant appeals.

R.Z ;LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
---·-------.:...=:.--1

Defendant seeks r2vcrsal of the judgment

and juugr.12nt in l1is favor as a n·,_rJ.tter of la,,-r,
or

t:~at

failing, a ne"'i'l trial.
STAT~L(ENT

OF FACTS

to tile polic3 in Provo and said that "Billi:;
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H~s

Stu:Jbs
h·~

t;oing to sign a

co:·.~plai nt

unless

could get the monG)' for these chocks that

he !1ad 1:ll'i ttcn be fur·_; the bank opGned that
mornin~~"·

LC!)'l1nd
U

,, 1• ,l' -~ •

I_

J

~:~ ~::
o

He told the 1.·Jitn:;ss

l'Q}~..;r,

;~illi(;

datecl.-i~'/'.J

that ll·3 had signed the name

3tubbs to the \~54. 00 elY~ ck and

that he didn't have authority from her to sign
t.~·J

check. (Tr 15)
The check involved is dated Decer11ber 7,

19()2 and i~ a blank counter draft with the

nar.10 ot

B~Ja1ker

Bank

a!~d

Trust Coo - Farmers

and t·I8rc:1ants Brancl1 of Provo, Ut. ·' written
in i:1k.

It is payable to the order of James

B. Donnis and is sig-ned nMrso Billie Stubbsn
r.ta1~..:::r.

as

It b8ars the word "Laborn in the

lower left hand corner.
,, .....

.·I'

•

,..

f

•

31

•

The face amount is

On the face of the check in red ink

i:·:pr2 ssed by a large rubb2r stamp is the word

PAID Deco 11, 1962 with the large numerals
97-lSo

T?1·J check v1as endorsed on the back

"Ja:-n.es Bo Dennis" and ncurl~y' s Market a o
!··:8re is no evidence in ti1e r3cord to contraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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d5ct the fact
e.i for

t:~at

pa~,:~~nt,

'"Then the

c~L~ck

was present-

it '1·1a:3 paid by th3 Bank on

which it was drai:fn. (State Exo No. 1)
Prior to 02cember

7,

1962, the Defendant

had work~d for ~1rs. Billtc~ Stubbs. ( T~ 19)
paid him by. means of a c rh~' ck.

She

She had 8i ven

him chacLs nbut also my bookkeeper has made a
check out for him to sign if o ( Tr 19)

The Defend-

'.

ant had written figures on a pad and "vve have
talked it over and discussed itoj'
occasJ_ons arose when

11

These

we have done a job and

he has written a persons name on the pad and
the figuresn (Tr 19)

I•.'Irs. Stubbs tGstified

that based on her familiarity with the writing
of Defendant, she did not know whether the
writing of the name of Mrs. Billie Stubbs on
the face of the check was made"by Defendant.
(Tr 22)

Tl1e Defendant's attorney on page 12 of
the Transcript asked ~trso Stubbs if it was
not a fact

t~1at

she had told tli:n in a conver-

sation prior to trial that she doubted that
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..··r· . D·Jnnis
{tr 12)

:1at sir:n;~d his name on t::at check.
~

Th3 Court sustained an objaction to

the quest]_o!1o

T:1·~

DGfendant cashed the check

at r~1tcJ. .;~rt s IIarlc;t on Dccembr;:;r 7, 1962. (1!r 8)
. ., :nt into the store quite oftc no

H~.~

was OK'd by the son of the
Caslli·~r !~ave

Mana~ar

The
and

the Defendant the moneyo

cl1~; ck

t~e

There

is no evidence that anyone saw the Defendant
sign the name of Hrso Billie Stubbs as

r;~aker

or the name of James Bo Dennis as endorser.
l~o

Heber Grant Ivins, Assistant District

~~torney

th~

in his opening statement did not tell

Jury he 1,vould prove that the Defendant sign-

ed the name of Mrs. Billie Stubbs to the checko
i!J said it was presented and endorsed by :the
d~fendant.

(Tr 4)

These facts become material

tipc:1 the question of' 1.vhether the Defendant ever

had any intention to defraud Fonzo Do Black or
a:1y other perso.no

ARGUMENT
STATEI-IENT OF POINT NUMBER ONE
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1.

The Stat8 did not present evidence

rrurn ,J,ich a Jury could find beyond a reason-

doubt that the
-tion of defrauding anyone

had any inteil-

D~;f:_;ndant

abL:

o

It is signi.Cicant that the record shov1s

that no complaint or objection to the cashing
of this check Has. ma'd8 by

I~.Irs

o

Billie Stubbs,

or anyone else until Feb. 13, 1963 o
r~quires

The law

the Bank upon which this check was

drawn to know the signatures of its depositors,
~d

the presumption arises that before this

ch8ck was cleared through Walker Bank, the
signature of the maker was adopted or ratified by Billie Stubbs.

This presurnption is

fortified by the fact that

ther~

is no evi-

denc2 in the record that the signature on the

faca of th3 check looks anything like the
signature of 3illi3 Stubbs.

The real signa-

ture is found in the record on the complaint,
and

shoi:Js

affirmati v2ly that it does not
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r;:i.:r.!bl~

the \"lriting on th·2 ch3Cko

T:h~r;

are oth2r cogent facts which show

thJ State did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that

tl1~2

Def~ndant

had any fraudulent

int2nt when h8 cashed the check at Curley's
::ar·k,.;t.

r.Jllcn IIrso Stubbs got her checks re-

turned from the Bank shortly after the first

of January, 1963, and found the check endorsed
by her 01:ployee James Bo Dennis, 1-1hat did she

do?

She did not have the check charged back

by tr12 l'lalker Bank to the State Bank of Provo,
·,·J:L!r2

s::2

it had been deposited by Curley's I.Iarket.

r.:.1 tified the signature of her name, and

approved of the prior action of both banks and
Curl_;yt s I-Iarket in cashing the check bearing
11er name signed by. some person \vi thout her

prior authority.

She did the very thing which

James B. Dennis intended she would do when he
cashc;d the check. She ratified the signatures

and the

cashi~g

a:li pa:r

~'ler.

and told him to get the money

She gave him until Feb. 11 when

Dennis went to the Police Department and told
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

them she was going to :;ign a col!:plaint unless
c~ t

he could

the money o

II·! rot_~arctc~d th ~ trans-

advanc·.-~

action as a loan or

o L' l:JiJ.t':e:_; .which he

would have to pay back o i U1c 1· in la hor or money.,
v~as

The check

marked

11

Laboru. d0 lla<l v1orkcd for

~rso Stubbs before Deco
A.tl

7,

l962o

intention on the par·t of Dennis to de-

iraud or deceive anyone f_i_nds no support in
'

the

r2COl'd.

.

No one with enou.c;h r.1cntal capacity

to be able to formulate an intent to defraud
\'/ould select the

rw~ans

used by Dennis o

that the signature on the l.':tc

~

He knew

of the chc ck Mrs o

Billie Stubbs, did not resumblc her real sienatur·~.

He knew that if the Vlalk.)r Dank paid the

check because they failed to observe the fact

the sit:;:1a turo was not genuin·.], that f!Irs. -Stubbs
·.·:ould notice it t'lfas not her :.Jignaturc ...,;~

~n

sh0 looked at her ban~ balance and returned
c:~cckso

He did not attempt to conc;)al in any

mann.;r i1is identity as th~ p ~rson v1ho re cci ved
t~1e money frol:'l. Curl2y's 1·1art~-:t..

ther2

0::1

th3 hat.! been

orevious occasions and 1:10.~) knovJri to
.....

-

"c.he son of t~e Manager.

~Ie e;ave his arLlr8 ss
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and

t~l-;phone

nu.rnb3r.

He did not

lau.v'.~

town.

SoQotime between Dec. 7 and Febo 13 the
attitude of

Lr~::>.

Dennis changed.

through

iL•r

Billie Stubbs tov1ard James B•

••

When the check was cleared

bank and paid on De9o 11, 1962,

sha presuraably was
•:.'r

"~;Tilling

:)nployc:;-debtor.

to regard him as

She did not return his

c>. :ck to her bank in January, 1963, but continued to treat the transaction as an advance
of wages or a loan to be repaid with laboro

But on Febo 13, 1963, she signed a criminal
cu·~,plaint

after thrGatening to do so if he

JiJ not pay her before that date.

It did not

occur to h::;r that she had been defrauded by
3.

crj_r.:inal acto

Her actions are consistent

only uith the obvious fact that Dennis either

kn2w or had reason to believe when he cashed

the check that she.would ratify his act in
t!1us

dratving

~:?5.4o31

as an advance of wageso

It is respectfully submitted that all
the State proved or that a Jury could find
b2yo~d a reasonable doubt, was that the Defend-

ant Sponsored
obtained
money by an unauthorized signature,·
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

w}~ich

was later ratified

name was

si~:.,tl~d

;Jy

the person whose

and that at the tir;12 the name

was signed, the Defendant

w~o

endorsed and cash-

ed the check, intended to pay the check in full

to his employer.
The fact that the check was paid and the
payment by the Bank not objected to by the person whose name was signed without authority,
would not r,.;quire reversal of the case if there
was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Dennis
intended at the time he cashed the check, that
h·~

·.-1C11ld not pay it.

But the fact that no objec-

tion was made to the unauthorized signature itsJli' and

t~12

coniplaint was signed because the

money \"'as not paid to Ivlrso Stubbs, raises a
strong presumption lthat Dennis ·did reasonably
believe that llrs o Stubbs vJould ratify his signature and
~e

becor1~e

his creditor for

:~j54ol3.

do not ask this Court to approve the

business methods of the Defe~dant, but we
earnestly submit that the record fails to sustain a finding that the D8fendant intended to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dl:

a:l~'On3

r_'ra:ld

0

It is only incidental proof'

oi this failure of proof, that he did not in
fact defrav.d anyone.

u:: .:n I-Irs o Stubbs rati-

••

:.i3d the clearing of the che.ck, she became

\iilletts Vo Scudder 11:-lr Po 87 (Ore 1914)
was a case ivh-:Jre th'J plaintiff sued the defendant l'or libel and recovered a judgment \vhich
was affirmed on appaalo

The defendant had

written a letter accusing the plaintiff of
fo1'L_;r~r·

The plaintiff had a check payable

to Scudder Syrup Coo which he

r~ceived

from

Allen & Lewis in payment of a debt due the
Syrup Company.

On Novo 20, 1911, Willetts

wrote to Scudder Co. asking it for permis-sion
to use the

mon~y

covered by the check as an

aJvance on his salary for January and February
· 1912.

Before he received an answer to his re-

quest, he endorsed the check in blank by
i·rritin[ on the back "Scudder Syrup Coo, A.L.
~illetts, and deposited it to his credit in

his bank.

The Court said :
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"It appear:J .CnJJ·! the evidence
that the plaintiff indorsed the check
before he received letters from the
company or the d·2f2ndant telling him
that it \vas sati:3factory for him to
havJ th2 r1'0:L:y as he had requestedo
'i,~le check, after its indorsement, was
placJd to tl1·~ plaintiff's credit at
Ladd & Tilton's bank, where he did his
banking business. He wrote the company's
name on the back of the chec~ in his
ordinary handwriting, without any disguise, and wrote his own name below it
in the same hapdwriting. In his evidence
he says that he indorsed the check as
agent of the company, and he appears
to hav2 thought that, by writing the
cor1pany' s name and his name irrunediately below it on the back of the check,
he indorsed the check as agent of the
coLpany. Vlhen the plaintiff was testifyi!lf:':, after he had told of the indorsing
of the check and depositing it in the
bank, and asking the company for leave
to use the money, a juror asked him
whether he always did it that way, and
he answered: 'I have done that in at
least one other instance, and it was
satisfactory.' This statement was not
denied by any-evidence. That statement seems to mean that he had in at·
least one other instance indorsed and
applied a check of the company in the
same way that he did in this instance,
and that his acts in doing so were
satisfac;toryo This is a circumstance
t~~Jing, to some extent, to show that
the company had previously permitted
l:in to indorse a che cko
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1

1

1

\:,.

OnJ of tiL:; mat;rial facts n:;c2ssary
to constitute the crime of forg3ry
is an intent to d·Jfraudo If t~1'3 plaintiff, when h;:; indqrsed t:1e check, acted in good faith and believed that he
l:ad a richt, as agent of the company,
to i~iors2 it, and did not intend to~
defraud any qne, he did not commit
the crin8 of forberyo The signing of
another's name to a note or a check
without authority is not riecessarily
forgery. It constitutes that offense
only when it is done with intent to
defraud."
In l·icCay v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 22 S.Wo 975,

the Court says in part:

"It is not every signing of
another's name without authority
which constitutes forgery. There
must inhere in the act an intent to
injura or defraudo If there is a
reasonable and honest belief that
the signature will be approved,
there can be no forgery.n
The burden of proving forgery

beyon~

a

reasonable doubt rests on the State and requires proof to establish the falsity of the
signature and that the purported signers
nama was signed without his authority. State
v. Jones 20 P. 2d 614 - 81 Uo 503;

State

Vo

Gorham 48 P. 2d 447 - 87 Uo 86.
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v!:1.ile the record in the Dennis case does

show testimony that the signature of the maker

was not authorized, the evidence that the signature was ratified by i':lrs. Stubbs is so convi:lCi't~~ and incontradicted that the verdict

of the Jury holding defandant guilty, is not

sustained by the recordo
ch~ck

The fact that the

was paid by 'the Bank and no complaint

made by Mrso Stubbs until February 13, 1963,
imposed on the State the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the signature

was not ratified by Mrso Stubbso

The fact

of ratification destroys the conclusion of

intention to defraudo

I:

Upon this point, it is important to note
that it is not necessary to

p~ove

that Dennis

had a prior agr:;ement that Nrso Stubbs would
ratify l1is act in cashing the checko It is
sufficient ·to require r·eversal if the record
does not sustain the vardict of the Jury
that

De~~is

~arket

I

intended to defraud Curley's

{Fonzo Black).
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In State vs. Tavlor (Utah 1963) 378 P. 2d
~,

this Court held and said:
"In a.criminal proceeding it is
not sufricient to show merely that
the accus0d has been dishonest, or
that he is a cheater, or otherwise of
bad charactero He is e;ntitled to be
charged with a specific crima so that
he may know the 'nature and cause of
the accusation against him.' And the
State must prove substantially as
charged the offense it rel~es u~on
for convictiono 11

In the Taylor case, the defendant had cheated

various business houses from whom he had
bought meat scrapso
bezzling

~?50o00

He was charged with em-

from Utah By-Products Coo

The conv·i ction was reversed o

POINT TWO
The Trial Court committed prejudicial
error in not declaring a·mistrial on its own
~tion

upon the opening statement of counsel

for the defendant.
In his opening stat8ment, the defendant's
attorney told the Jury that

nam3 appears on the

c~1ack

~!Irso

Stubbs, whose

as the drawer, would

be called to testify that it 1.1as not her signa-

14.
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tur~:

and that she didn't authorize the p2rson

who put it on the check to do so, and that she

wtll testify that she did not believe the defendant did it either.

The defendant will be call-

ed to. testify and he will adnit that he dido
He signed a confession that· he did, but he didn't.

He didn't put that name on that check;

he didn't forge it, and I want you to watch
him very carefully when he testifies and said
that he dido
Now the prosecution will ask the defendant if he has ever been convicted of a felony,
and this is a felony and he will answer "Yes
t~1at he had".

/
I

The prosecution \'Till ask him

that question to show that his testimony is
umtorthy of belief; that you can't believe
hir: as to whether or not he is testifying to
th3 truth because he has already conmitted a
serious crim2, and under our law the Court
.. will instruct you that you can disregard his

15.
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/

testify if you don't believe he is telling
the truth, because he has been convictad of a
felony once, and this casts a cloud upon his
ability to tell the truth.

~c ~~

The defsndant didn't hire me to represent
him to plead not ruiltyo

Ths defendant doesn't

want this tric:l; he wanted to plead guilty to
this charge. He has already admitted to the
police that he is guilty to this charge 9 and
h~~

is going to tell you that he is guilty.

But he is not guilty o

And I want you to watch

hin when he testifies, because ·he didn't do

it.

He did:1't forge that check.
It is unnecessary and it is unfair to

counsel for defendant in the Trial Court for
this Court to speculate upon \vhat

motiv~s

and r-:;asons impelled counsel to make such an
op2:1i:1f; statement.

The damage resulting from

t~2 opening statement is further compounded by

.• the fact t~at the Assistant District Attorney,
after Dennis had testified that he signed the
:'la!!:e Ers o Billie Stubbs to. the check -'-:.·1i thout
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I

authority, and when there was no basis or
reason

H~1atever

testimony
the

for the admission of any

relat:int~

to other crimes, asked

de.L·-~ndant

"Qo

Have you ever been convicted of
a felony Mr. Dennis?

A.

Yes

Q.

What \'las that felony?

A.

Carnal knowledge.

Q.

When was that conviction?

Hro Nixon: i/Je object to that questiono
He has asked him the questiono

The Court:

The objection is sustained.

It is difficult to understand what purpose the

Assistant District Attorney had in mind which
could serve the ends of justice in
a questiono

aski~g

such

Not only ~hact' Dennis testified

that he wrote the name of Mrs<:' Stubbs on the
face of t1l3 check
attorney for

~1ro

i·.Ji thout

authority, but the

Dennis in tre opening state-

ment had told the Jury that Dennis was being
required to stand trial against his own wishes
because he \·;anted to plead guilty to the charge
of forg2 -::=.r.
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The District .L'.ttorney had no occasion to

·mp;,..-:.ac'l. D-~nnl·
s
l•
-

or prove that he was not

tellinr the trtith, because he had been convicted of a prior felonyo

His only purpose·

could ·have been to hav:; prejudiced and blackcned the character of Dennis in the minds of
the Jurors.
It is difficult to understand wny the
learned Trial Judge did not recognize that
after the op2ning statement of the attorney
for defendant, and the introduction of the
testimony r·2 tarding carnal kno\vledge, it was
impossible for the defendant to have received
a fair trialo

It is a mockery of the admin-

istration of justice for a Court to permit
a defendant to proceed to trial before a Jury
upon a felony charge of forgery, after his
attorney in his opening statement had said
that

.. and

t~e

defendant wanted to plead guilty

the defendant has testified 1vithout

reason

H~1at2ver,

a!1f

so far as an orderly trial

is concerned, that he had been

convict~d

of
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("'":) •
arna 1 1.~T!O W]•• ed c..."'

Such ;nformatl'
O'l
hav2
•
- m1· cr:.)·>t
•

e3n useful to the Trial Court upon sentenc8 of
he defendant.

T:1·~

Trial Court should have

,ccepted a plea of guilty, or ta1:-:;n the trouble
lt that stage of the proceoding, to fiad out
~e

reasons which impelled counsel for defend-

ant to be placed in the stranga position demonstrated by this record.
~h~

defendant

but

h~)

\'I ants

He tells the. Jury that

to plead guilty to forgery,

is not guilty and his testimony that he

is guilty cannot be believed becaus2 he has
bclen convicted of carnal knowledge o
w~

~ourts

are told that it is the function of the
and the District Attorneys not merely to

)btain convictions but to see that all persons
)~for~

th·J Court receive
., justice.

should have been stopped

l!1[.S

w~l8n

The proceedthe opening

:;tatements 1·1ere completed and the· defendant
~it::2r

~2ly

allo\V"ed to cl:.an.ge his plea to guilty and

upon thJ discretion and mercy of t~1e Court,

)r c·t~~,:;r appropria~e proceedings taken 'dhich
ro~d

hava resulted in a fair trial.

The effect
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of th~ opzninr.; BtatGncnt 'lias a Pl:~a of G'-~_il ty

before the Jury.

The prajudicial and

~: :~ropJr

tc0timony relating to the conviction of carnal
knowl::.~d[~.J

made conviction certain regarc1l8 :3S of

what the tGstimony showed regarding the merits

of the cas0.

In State

VSo

Sanchez 361 Po 2d 174 this

Court held:
n~:~ ~:' ~c: in serious criminal cases,
under special circumstances, "vvher-::; the
interests of justice so require, this
Court may notice palpable and significant error even though proper objections wcr2 not taken at the trial."

In State

VSo

Cobo 60 P. 2d 952

90 U. J2,

this Court r2versed a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter and held:

·'

11 Th at such error V'Tas manifest
and of necessity resulted to the prejudice of the accused and deprived him
of a fair trial cannot well be doubted.
Because of such manifest error and
further because, as already indicated,
that the judgment of the court below
must -be r2versed and a new trial granted upon ot-her grounds, ~·Te deem it our
dut~r to notice the error and to correct
it, though no exception was taken thereto, in order that on a retrial of ti2
case the same error may not again be cor:!- .
mittedo 11
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~n

© ©©:l @!_€~)

.L !l

.:)IJcilA;

0

o~_p_"]ryt")! c ~--

VSo -:c-.~'-~ 1\.'

3i.

.t' o

2d 1091

J

85 uo

the Court held:
"In this case the defendant admitted that if the act were proved,
the intent would be sufficiently shown.
The defendant was not admitting the
signin~ of the name and then offering
sor ~ excuse, authority, mistake, or
defense t,L ;;refor; but was denying and
did deny the writing entirely.
We find no basis within the rule
or any of the exceptions making the
admission of the other checks alleged
to be forged admissibleo Each of the
other two checks offered and received
in evidence was payable to a different
payee, cashed at a different time and
at a different place, and by different
persons than the check, the forgGry of
which the defendant was charged witho
Vie think it was prejudicial error
to admit in evidence the checkso They
tended to prove other separate and distinct offenseso For the reasons stated
the judgment of the trial cour~ is reversed and the cause remanded with dirzctions to grant a new trial. ri
-

.. ,

In State vs. Stewart 171 Paco 2d 383,

110 Utah 203, the defendant was convicted of
driving a vehicle while under the influence
of liquor and of having previously been convictad of the same crime as alleged in the
informationo

The Court held that the allega-
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tions

--~---

0

"u .............................. ~

~-

_minali ty were

not sufficient to raise that

issu·~

o

The

only charee properly before the Jury being
that r8latine to the substantive offenseo
The prior convictions were incompetent evi-

dence on that charge:
"Since, in the instant case the
prior convictions could not properly
be considered by the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the
defendant of the substantive offense,
we conclude that it was reversible
error to permit evidence thereof to
be presented to the jury in the trial
of that issueo"
In State vso Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64

Paco 2d 229, this Court said:
"Certainly, if counsel knowing
that a witness should not be compelled
to answer, regardless of the exercise
of her p3rsonal privilege, should by
askin~ a number of questions which implied immorality, fpr the purpose of
carrying to the ~jury such impression
and which it was fairly evident did
carry to the jury such an impression,
this court might reverse the case with
censure on counsel whether or not the
I'Iitness claimed her privilegeon
Since there was no reason whatever for
t::.e Assistant District Attorney to affect the
22o
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I:

r~dability

of th2

dcf.~ndant,

it was ir11proper

nrl pr·.!judicial to bring to the attJntion of

he Jury the prior conviction for carnal kno\·rl-

dge.
Sxa!t!ination of the record in this case by
tnyone not far:tiliar with any of the facts outlide the r\JCOrd, compels the conciusion that
~e

defendant was d2nied a fair trial by an un-

1rJjudiced Jury upon the criwe of forgery with
rhich he was chargedo
latinL~
~ich

;he

Th2ro may have been ext:.;n-

circumstanc3s and facts outside the record
explain, but could not justify or condone

procJ8di:1r~

as it

app~ars

from the record.

:f counsel for a defendant feels impelled, by

·eason of his candor and integrity to make the
1

penin[_; statement before

~

t~1e

Jury, which was made

counsel in this case, the Jury should be dis-

:harged and counsel should be relieved of his
'bligation to his client.

1.!!1il·~

the effect o.f

·:'le opening stat.2ment was to make it· co1::pl2tely
·'
r:possibl2 for the defendant to g2t a fc:.ir and
cpartial trial, it did not mention to tha Jury
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the fact that the check involved was actually
paid by the Bank on December 11, 1962, and
that the transaction was treated as a loan
by

~Irso

Billie Stubbs to her employee Dennis

until February 13, 1963, and that the Jury
could well have found that Dennis had no intention o.f defrauding his employero

The ques-

tion of whether the name· of the maker was signed by the defendant or someone else becomes
immaterial in this case, because th·3r2 is no
dispute f:r:om tha record that tn2 defenda1.1t
cashed the check at Curley's Market.
Casual comparison of the name James B.
Dennis which appears on the face of the check
as payee, indicates that it is not the sac2
handwriting as the endorsement of James Bo
Dennis on the back of the checko

The case

was tried belo\v on the theory that it vias a
valid defense if the Jury could be convinced
~that

because the

defenda~t

was a convicted

felon, h~ could not be believed \AJhen he testified he signed the check v.Ji thout autnori ty o
?J.
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It io not surprising

t~at t~e

Jury

~2~

not

convtnc ~d by t::j s th80rJ, becaus'J it must
h:1vc be3n appar:::nt to the Jury that it taacJe

littlo diff,..:r\..:nce 'ttJho signed the names in
q,lestion of IVlrso Stubbs and Mro Dennis on

the back of the

ch~ck

if the defendant cash-

ed the el1eck at Curley's Market when he
obviously

~new

the name of

~rrs.

Stubbs had

been signed not by her and without authorityo
Th~re

was

folPld such

still a cogent valid thsory which
strong support in the testimony

that we submit t!d_s Court must hold, as a
matter of law that the case should not have
been submitt3d to the Jury; that Dennis did
not intend to defraud his employer or anybody elsa.

He was

charg~d

.

with defrauding

'

Fonzo Black, but it is undisputed that Black
received his money from the Bank.

As the

record stands, there is no proof that the
dafanda~t

Nrso

to

at the time of trial had not paid

Billie Stubbs the ~?54o3l 1·:hich he owed

h~ro
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In a
~82

r~c~nt

Utah caso,

P. 2:1 407, invol'Ii n[~ an

Stat~

vs. Kazda,

erron~ous

admis-

sion of evidence of prior felony convictions
the Court said, "The apparent purpose and r:;a-

I,

son fur p-:;rmitting the prosecution to question
t;1·~

accused r;;cu.rding prior felony convictions

is to

.:tf.f'~: ct

his

cr..:~di bili ty

The defendant

D~nnis

as a

'tli tn3 ss on

in the instant case

had tastified that he signed the check without authorityo

There was no reason for the

prosecution to affect hjs credibility as a
1:itness o
Tlt~..:

~~'-2~,__ _12

Kazda case

follo~.-Js

State vs o Dick-

Uto 2d 8, 361 Po 2d 4i2o

The Court

rev2rsed a conviction of robbery because evidence of other crimes was improperly admitted.
T!1:.;

..

I

I.

Court said:
· "The universally accepted general
rule is that such evide::;,ce is not adr~is
sa':l~ if -"_ ts effect is merelv to disgrace th~ def2ndant or show his oronen"t
~
~
SJ. y to COI::T!li t crir~e on
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I

·

No rcasonaolc

J111.'y

co-tld possibly find,

bJyond a r8asonable dbubt, that the defendant
could hav·:J

int(~nded

to defraud his

employ~r,

in v.i •.;\1 of t:;e complete absence of any decept.!.on used l)y himo

He intended to become her

debtllr for :..;54o31 and she concurred in his intention by her action frou December 11, 1962
wh-~n

the check was paid presumably with her

knowledge and approval and sometime in Febo

1963 when she told Mro Dennis that if he didn't make the check good she would have to
swear Otlt a complainto
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment and conviction of
the Trial Court should be reversed •.
. , Respectfully submitted,
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